The French Administrative Court\u27s Rulings on Compensation Claims Brought by Jewish Survivors of World War II by Rouquette, Rémi
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 14
The French Administrative Court's Rulings on
Compensation Claims Brought by Jewish
Survivors of World War II
Rémi Rouquette
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rémi Rouquette, The French Administrative Court's Rulings on Compensation Claims Brought by Jewish Survivors of World War II, 25 Md.
J. Int'l L. 304 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol25/iss1/14
ROUQUETTE MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010 2:55 PM 
 
 
 
304 
 
The French Administrative Court’s Rulings 
on Compensation Claims Brought by Jewish 
Survivors of World War II 
 
RÉMI ROUQUETTE
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_______________________ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The politics of collaboration during the Nazi occupied Vichy 
government involved important anti-Semitic components, as much 
against French Jews (who were stripped of their French nationality 
before their deportation and extermination) as against foreign Jews: 
namely, refugees who had fled the anti-Semitic policies of their 
countries of origin. The Vichy government put in place laws of 
exclusion from society (Jews were prohibited from employment in 
most jobs and were subject to employment quotas, etc.) and the 
aryanization of assets,1 which plunged the majority of the Jewish 
population into misery at best or an ignominious death at worst. 
Starting with the implementation of the final solution (the Wansee 
Conference, at which the Nazis decided on the ―final solution,‖ was 
held on January 20, 1942), the Vichy government used police and 
gendarmes to arrest massive numbers of Jews, as in the infamous 
 
† Docteur en droit public (Ph.D. in Administrative Law), Habilitation à la 
Direction de la Recherche (grants authority to supervise the research and writing of 
legal dissertations). 
1. ―Aryanization‖ refers to the forcible dispossession of Jews of their property, 
with Jewish-owned businesses to be run by non-Jews, now referred to as ―Aryans‖ 
in order to place the context of Judaism and its opposite in an allegedly racial, 
rather than religious, context. See, e.g., Emmanuelle Triol, L’Aryanisation des 
biens: L’application judiciaire du statut des Juifs, in JUGER SOUS VICHY, LE DROIT 
ANTISÉMITE DE VICHY 61–71 (Maurice Olender ed., 1996). 
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round-up of the Vel d’Hiv.2 Mostly, but not exclusively, they rounded 
up those who were foreigners or who retroactively were deprived of 
French citizenship.3 For logistical reasons, the repression was even 
worse in the North than in the so-called ―free‖ zone in the South. 
When France was liberated, an August 9, 1944 Order put an end to 
these measures and, generally, to all those which were contrary to 
republican principles. The annulment of the Vichy ―laws‖ has been 
deemed to apply retroactively to most of its measures and most 
notably to its racial legislation. However, there was no special 
provision for reparations; the survivors received the same 
compensation as war victims. The restitution of expropriated property 
was never even complete, which eventually led to compensatory 
measures in the 1990s. 
This cleaning up of the legal order was accompanied by debate 
among French people initiated by General de Gaulle’s calling the 
Vichy government ―an aside‖ and rejecting all responsibility for 
official acts that had gone against republican principles. On the legal 
level, there was denial of liability: inasmuch as the harms resulted 
from acts specific to the Vichy government, based on the voided 
legislation, they were not compensable, whereas the most ordinary 
harms (e.g., automobile accidents) were compensable. Likewise, 
appeals to administrative law judges were also rejected for the same 
reason. 
With the progression of historical research and the concomitant 
lessening of resistance within French society, little by little, the 
French came to acknowledge that the Vichy government also had 
 
2. The round-up derived its name from the herding of whole families into the 
Vélodrome d’hiver, a Paris indoor track located near the Eiffel Tower. It is to this 
mass arrest which occurred in July 1942 that President Chirac was referring in the 
1995 speech from which M. Rouquette quotes. See infra, note 5. 
3. On July 22, 1940, Vichy promulgated a law to denaturalize foreign-born 
citizens who had become naturalized pursuant to France’s law of August 10, 1927, 
known as the loi Crémieux. Vichy created a commission empowered to review the 
citizenship of each and every citizen naturalized under that law. The 1927 law was 
used as the benchmark because it had facilitated the citizenship acquisition process 
and because it was widely believed that most of France’s foreign-born Jewish 
citizens had been naturalized thereunder. See Loi du 22 juillet 1940, Journal 
Officiel de la République Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 23, 
1940, p. 4567; MICHAEL R. MARRUS & ROBERT O. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND 
THE JEWS 324–25 (1995). See also generally Vivian Grosswald Curran, The 
Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy’s Suicide in Vichy 
France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998). 
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been France, and it also had been the French State. Two major events 
marked this revolution in the way the French viewed the Vichy 
government: Jacque Chirac’s 1995 speech about the Vel d’Hiv; and 
the Papon trials. To this must be added, although certainly of lesser 
importance, the case involving the decree that indemnified Jewish 
orphans, which was the source of the Lipietz lawsuit. 
In the speech delivered by President Jacques Chirac at the 
ceremony commemorating the July 1942 round-up, President Jacques 
Chirac stated: 
Fifty-three years ago, on July 16, 1942, 450 French police 
officers and gendarmes, under the authority of their (French) 
superiors, complied with Nazi demands.  
  On that date, in the capital and in the region surrounding 
Paris, nearly 10,000 Jewish men, women and children were 
arrested in the early hours of the morning in their homes and 
taken to police stations. One saw scenes of atrocity: families 
torn apart, mothers separated from their children, the elderly—
some of whom were World War I veterans, who had shed their 
blood for France—shoved ruthlessly into buses and vans of the 
Paris police. One would also see some police officers who 
looked the other way, allowing a few people to escape. 
  For all those people who were arrested, a long and painful 
descent into hell had just started. How many among them were 
never to see their homes and families again? And how many, 
at that moment, felt betrayed? And what kind of distress did 
they endure?  
  France, land of the Enlightenment and of the Rights of 
Man, a land of welcoming and of refuge, France, on that day, 
committed an irreparable act. Breaking its promise, it delivered 
those whom she should have protected to their executioners. 
Driven to the Velodrome d’hiver, the victims had to endure 
several days under horrible conditions, about which we know, 
before being taken to one of the transit camps—Pithiviers or 
Beaune-la-Rolande—set up by the Vichy authorities. 
  The horror, however, had only just begun. More round-ups 
and more arrests were to follow—in Paris and in the provinces. 
Seventy-four trains would leave for Auschwitz. Seventy-six 
thousand Jews would be deported from France, never to return. 
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We continue to owe them a timeless4 debt.5  
The speech of the President of the Republic acknowledged the 
continuity of the State, even when the most horrible government is in 
power.  The speech was challenged incidentally for this very reason, 
but the speech was not a juridical act. 
The Papon trial did add a legal aspect to this subject, and what a 
dimension: indeed, a criminal one. It was, first of all, a criminal trial 
that resulted in the only condemnation in our time of a high 
government official of the Vichy government, an official who had, 
afterwards under the Fifth Republic, pursued an administrative6 and 
political career. 
But Papon, convicted by the cour d’assises de Bordeaux, [i.e., the 
trial court], maintained before the Conseil d’Etat7 that the 
government should have rendered him harmless because he had acted 
in his capacity as a civil servant (which is the common law principle). 
The Conseil d’Etat accepted this reasoning8 by agreeing that a part of 
Papon’s mistakes had been committed while he was a civil servant 
although it found that he had been acting as a private individual for 
the rest. The legal and political novelty was mainly that: by agreeing 
with Papon that the French government should indemnify him, the 
Court was admitting that the current government could be held liable 
for the wrongdoings committed by the Vichy government.  
Moreover, the Papon decision followed the Pelletier decision.9 
 
4. The French word is imprescriptible, connoting both timeliness and an act not 
subject to a statute of limitations. 
5. President Jacques Chirac, Remarks delivered at the Ceremony 
Commemorating Vel d’Hiv, the July 1942 Round-Up (July 16, 1995) (on file with 
author).   
6. He was also responsible for the massacres of Algerians in 1962, when he was 
chief of police in Paris. 
7. The Conseil d’Etat is the highest administrative court, theoretically with the 
sole function of quashing lower court decisions, but it also has jurisdiction as a 
court of first and last resort in connection with certain trials of high-ranking 
government officials, as was the case for Papon when he sought to obtain 
indemnification from the French government for the judgment against him.  
8. Conseil d’Etat [CE Sect.] (High-administrative Court), Apr. 12, 2002, CE 
Sect., Rec. Lebon 139, concl. Mme Boissard (Fr.), available at http://arianeinternet. 
conseil-etat.fr/arianeinternet/ViewRoot.asp?View=Html&DMode=Html&PushDire 
ctUrl=1&Item=1&fond=DCE&Page=1&querytype=advanced&NbEltPerPages=5&
Pluriels=True&dec_id_t=238689.  
9. Conseil d’Etat [CE Ass.] (High-administrative Court), Apr. 6, 2001, CE Ass., 
Rec. Lebon 173, concl. M. Austry, available at http://arianeinternet.conseil-
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That decision had validated a decree which allotted an indemnity to 
individuals who had become orphaned during the war due to the 
deportation of their parents as Jews. But in that case, the Conseil 
d’Etat had stated, albeit in dictum, that no principle of government 
nonliability existed with respect to acts committed by the Vichy 
government. The words were clear: ―although the decree which was 
attacked aimed to acknowledge the sufferings endured by the orphans 
of certain victims of the deportations, it does not change the 
conditions under which individuals, who believe they are entitled 
pursuant to it, can file lawsuits against the government.‖ The Conseil 
d’Etat therefore encouraged the survivors to look for government 
liability based on the anti-Semitic legislation, which Mr. Georges 
Lipietz was the first to do. 
It is in this context that the Lipietz lawsuit took place in the early 
2000s and instilled immense hope among survivors (Part II); a hope 
that was to be snuffed out a few years later by the Hoffman decision 
(Part III). 
II. THE HOPES OF SURVIVORS 
Starting with the Pelletier decision, survivors of the dark years10 
had some hope of seeing the government held liable. On the one 
hand, the idea was rejected that the post-war Republic of France 
could not be held responsible for the crimes of a government that in 
fact had come in under the Nazi boot. On the other hand, the question 
of the statute of limitations appeared to be surmountable.  
A. The Decision of the Administrative Court of Toulouse 
This is exactly what happened, since by its June 6, 2006 judgment 
the Administrative Court of Toulouse, after having rejected defense 
arguments based on lack of jurisdiction and the statute of limitations, 
held the government and the SNCF liable to compensate the 
plaintiffs, with one third of the damages assigned to the SNCF.  
One will note that the case was filed in 2001, but the court ruled 
only in 2006. This delay was exceptionally long, even for that time, 
 
etat.fr/arianeinternet/ViewRoot.asp?View=Html&DMode=Html&PushDirectUrl=1
&Item=1&fond=DCE&Page=1&querytype=advanced&NbEltPerPages=5&Pluriels
=True&dec_id_t=224945.  
10. The reference in the original to the dark or ―black years‖ is the term 
commonly used to describe the years of Nazi Occupation. See, e.g., JEAN 
GUÉHENNO, JOURNAL DES ANNÉES NOIRES 1940–44 (1947).  
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which most likely can be explained by a certain discomfort. 
B. Jurisdiction 
The issue of the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction was a real 
consideration only with respect to the SNCF’s liability.11 The 
Administrative Court held that it had jurisdiction due to the fact that 
the SNCF was acting within the scope of governmental authority 
when it transported Jews to the internment camps. The 
Administrative Court therefore applied the normal legal criterion in 
its reasoning. Subsequently, the Administrative Court of Appeals, 
and later the Conseil d’Etat,12 hearing, respectively, the appeals of the 
SNCF and the Lipietz plaintiffs, decided to set aside this legal 
criterion, deeming that only the government truly had acted within 
the scope of governmental authority, as if the SNCF had had no 
autonomy [and that, therefore, the administrative courts lacked 
jurisdiction over the SNCF]. 
The Conseil d’Etat deigned no more than to decide the case as an 
ordinary proceeding, in contrast to the far more careful attention it 
had paid to the appeal for indemnification previously brought by 
Papon against the government. 
Most of all, the Conseil d’Etat reviewed the assessment of the facts 
which governed jurisdiction in a strange manner. It clearly indicated 
that, as far as it was concerned, the SNCF was not liable and that only 
the government was at fault. This ruling obviously discouraged other 
lawsuits. Above all, one may criticize the Court, which was supposed 
to decide only the appellate trial, for plunging into the heart of the 
initial trial and thereby usurping the very authority that it just 
declared to belong to the judge for criminal law matters.  
What is strange in this decision is not the rule of law that was 
applied. The latter did not come as a surprise, and it was what the 
petitioners consistently invoked (contrary to what the SNCF argued, 
which was that the interned individuals were ordinary passengers 
 
11. The SNCF, a government-owned company before the war, had become a 
government-owned industrial and commercial company in 1982; as with all 
institutions of this kind, private business law applies to it, public (i.e., 
administrative) law becoming applicable when issues of governmental authority 
arise.  
12. Conseil d’Etat [CE] (High-administrative Court), Dec. 21, 2007, CE, Rec. 
Lebon 139, concl. Mme L. et autres (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/cde/node.php?articleid=823. 
ROUQUETTE MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:55 PM 
310 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:304 
using industrial or commercial services). The surprise is that the 
Conseil d’Etat denied that the SNCF had been acting within the 
scope of governmental authority on the basis of a lapidary analysis, 
following a somewhat summary opinion,13 without questioning 
whatsoever the theoretical content, not even the concrete dimension 
of the nature of acting within the scope of governmental authority. 
Thus, under its reasoning, the issuance of a certification of 
shipworthiness by a private company would come within the 
Administrative Court’s jurisdiction, since in such a case conduct 
within the scope of governmental authority would exist,14 whereas the 
transporting of human beings in sealed cattlecars is not evidence of 
such conduct. 
Actually, the Conseil d’Etat shirked its responsibility, deeming 
that it should share the task of handling the last lawsuits of the 
Second World War with the criminal law courts. In reality, one 
should not look for a legal reason in a solution that at heart was just 
an opportunistic decision.  
The analysis of the SNCF’s role in fact was completely erroneous. 
The report, kept virtually confidential, commissioned by the SNCF 
and submitted by the researcher, Mr. Bachelier, revealed quite clearly 
that the SNCF was zealous and did not even abide by the barely 
minimal requirements that Vichy had ordered [for the train transport 
towards the camps] when it even refused to provide water and access 
to toilets and limited humanitarian stops because the Red Cross 
interference slowed down the trains, etc. Moreover, the SNCF 
required payment for its services. Bachelier’s report largely 
dismantled the myth of the SNCF as having been part and parcel of 
the French Resistance. It showed that the majority of the SNCF 
leadership collaborated with the Nazis and that the railway workers 
who were part of the French Resistance opposed the SNCF. By some 
sort of sleight of hand, the Administrative Court of Appeals of 
Bordeaux and the Conseil d’Etat deleted the SNCF’s responsibility. 
Certainly on a formal level, these courts ruled only that they had no 
 
13. The government commissioner, who has since become a rapporteur public, 
is to provide the administrative courts with a detailed opinion concerning the trial.  
14. SA Bureau Véritas et autres, Nos. 33803 & 34462, Conseil d’Etat [CE] 
(High-administrative Court), Mar. 23, 1983, concl. M. Denoix de Saint Marc, 
available at http://arianeinternet.conseil-etat.fr/arianeinternet/ViewRoot.asp?Vie 
w=Html&DMode=Html&PushDirectUrl=1&Item=1&fond=DCE&Page=1&queryt
ype=advanced&NbEltPerPages=5&Pluriels=True&dec_id_t=33803. 
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jurisdiction (which however was nevertheless largely exercised 
against the SNCF) under the rationale that according to them only the 
State was liable. It should be emphasized that the chances of success 
in the criminal law courts are difficult to assess: one person, Mr. 
Schaechter,15 failed in the Paris Court of Appeals, but well before the 
SNCF’s specific role had been revealed by the Bachelier report. 
C. The Statute of Limitations 
The statute of limitations had been set aside by the Administrative 
Court of Toulouse. With respect to the government, that had been 
very easy, the statute of limitations having been argued in a most 
irregular manner, probably on the order of higher ups (President 
Chirac was still in power), thereby allowing the government to 
respect the President’s words without giving the impression of 
deliberately losing the lawsuit. But the Administrative Court of 
Toulouse did not abide by this procedural aspect. It set aside the 
statute of limitations by reasoning that it had not been possible for the 
plaintiffs to act before the April 12, 2002 Papon decision, the ruling 
which had, as previously mentioned, assigned liability for the first 
and last time for acts of the Vichy government. For the SNCF, the 
Administrative Court of Toulouse considered that the information 
needed to establish its liability had been known only after the 
beginning of 1996, the year the aforementioned Bachelier Report was 
completed. 
D. Reaction 
Once the Administrative Court of Toulouse’s decision became 
public, it caused a huge amount of debate in the media and on the 
Internet. By contrast, the government remained totally silent. French 
legal journals also made very little commentary on the decision. 
Apart from a few anti-Semitic attacks (the majority of which were 
implicit rather than explicit because French law prohibits them), the 
decision was criticized for a whole host of reasons. Some objected to 
the trial for having occurred so long after the relevant events had 
taken place, forgetting that any lawsuit had been strictly impossible 
before. Others objected to a lawsuit against the Republic, rehashing 
 
15. Mr. Schaechter, recently deceased, had discovered the bills that the SNCF 
had sent to the government for payment for the transportation of Jews, much to the 
displeasure of certain historians who were upset that a person not formally trained 
had accomplished the research that they should have done. 
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old arguments, such as Vichy was just ―an aside,‖ deeming that all of 
the harm had come from the Nazis. Others, very numerous, 
maintained a view, which later on influenced other administrative 
courts, that the compensation should be symbolic only, which seems 
to us to be a form of disguised anti-Semitism that stems from the 
myth of Jewish cupidity. The fact that one almost never hears this 
type of criticism in situations where it would make sense (for 
example in defamation suits) only reinforces this analysis.16  
Sometimes, solely the verdict against the SNCF was disputed, 
rehashing the myth of the State’s17 making the SNCF into an 
institution of the French Resistance, when in fact it was essentially, if 
not exclusively, on the side of collaboration, except for the few 
instances where railway workers sided with the Resistance and 
against the SNCF management of the time. The Jewish community, 
curiously, strongly defended the SNCF, which raised suspicions that 
this defense was linked to the SNCF’s monetary contributions to the 
remembrance of the Shoah. Let us also add that a part of the Jewish 
community criticized the fact that individuals had brought lawsuits 
on their own, even though many people who were persecuted based 
on the racially discriminatory laws never considered themselves to be 
Jewish because they were atheists or had converted to another 
religion long before. Finally, one must signal that part of the public 
believed, in part because of the false information published in 
newspapers, that the trial had been brought in Toulouse by Mr. Alain 
Lipietz, then well known as a member of the European Union’s 
Green Party, when in fact, like his sisters and his mother, he merely 
succeeded in interest to his father, following the latter’s death in 
2003. 
Elsewhere, from the victims’ point of view, the decision of the 
Administrative Court of Toulouse created a great sense of hope. 
More than a thousand petitions were filed with the French 
administrative courts by survivors or their relatives, represented by at 
least fifteen lawyers.18 The victims had even more hope inasmuch as 
 
16. This argument is not without analogy to those put forth by sexists who 
blame women who have been raped for asking the courts to require that the rapists 
compensate them. 
17. The myth is illustrated by René Clément’s movie La Bataille du Rail and 
Paul Durand’s hagiographic book la SNCF pendant la guerre. 
18. Let it be known that the author of this paper, who represented the jointly 
interested Lipietz parties, never took on another case of this kind but provided 
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the government had not appealed the Toulouse decision in favor of 
Lipietz (only the SNCF had appealed). Unfortunately, the new 
leadership of the French State changed the lay of the land. President 
Sarkozy, hostile to repentance and advised by Mr. Klarsfeld, himself 
very hostile to the Lipietz family lawsuit, clearly gave instructions to 
state authorities to systematically defend all of the appeals, which 
was done.  
III. THE CRUSHING OF HOPE 
There is a procedure in the administrative courts and the 
administrative courts of appeal that allows them to request an opinion 
from the Conseil d’Etat. This system, disputable in its theory because 
it is contrary to their duty to judge, generally is used only for 
deciding technical questions, never for assessing facts but always for 
legal issues.  
However, the Administrative Court of Paris chose this technique in 
its Hoffman opinion and referred a question to the Conseil d’Etat on 
the issue of the statute of limitations and on the possibility of a solely 
symbolic compensation for the injury. Curiously enough, the 
Administrative Court of Paris did not receive the answer to the 
questions it asked but did receive an answer to a question it did not 
ask. 
Indeed, in the February 16, 2009 opinion Number 315499,19 the 
Conseil d’Etat rendered a decision whereby the issue of the statute of 
limitations and that of the starting point for the running of the statute 
for the compensation action due to the Vichy government’s 
participation in a crime against humanity were moot because, 
supposedly, . . . all the wrongs had been compensated. 
A simple reading of the list established by the government and 
cited by the Conseil d’Etat of the people who had been compensated 
shows that this list is completely inaccurate. Sub-categories of 
victims did not receive anything if they did not fall into any of the 
foreseen cases, either because of their nationality or because of their 
relationship to those who died or for many other reasons. Except 
perhaps for that which concerns the restitution of assets (which is not 
 
assistance to colleagues who represented others in similar cases without charging 
for these services.  
19. This decree will be published in Lebon. 
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at issue in the current trials), not one victim received a sum 
comparable to that which he or she would have received had he or 
she been a victim of any other violation of law, and not one received 
the same amount as what Papon’s victims received.  
Moreover, if one reads any administrative law textbook, one would 
know that, when reparations are granted by the administration, the 
courts reserve the power and the duty to assess the damages by 
simply deducting the indemnities already paid.  
The ruling of the Conseil d’Etat is all the more surprising 
inasmuch as it does not correspond exactly to the questions the 
Administrative Court of Paris posed, which concerned the allegations 
of harm that could be compensated and the deductibility of the 
amounts paid within the framework of joint claims. The response is 
even more astonishing given that the government never maintained 
that all the wrongs had been indemnified. 
By declaring without the individual verification that normally 
comes from the administrative courts that all of the victims had been 
completely indemnified for all past wrongs, when this was not true, 
the Conseil d’Etat risked encouraging anti-Semitic stereotypes 
relating to money by creating the impression that they are partly 
based on truth.  
Of all the possible legal bases for a ruling unfavorable to the 
victims, the Conseil d’Etat therefore chose the worst one. Granted, it 
seems to partially make up for it by tinkering with the theme of 
symbolic reparation, since it considers that ―reparations for the 
exceptional suffering endured by the people who were victims of the 
anti-Semitic persecution . . . call for the solemn acknowledgment of 
the wrongs to which these people were collectively subjected.‖ To 
begin with, this would have been more convincing if the Conseil 
d’Etat had commented on its own role under the Vichy government 
and its refusal after the war to apply common law principles to the 
victims of Vichy.  
But most of all, lumping the injuries of each individual into a 
collective harm is to deny the particularity of each victim’s situation, 
especially of those who did not identify with the Jewish community 
or its institutions. However, this is what the Conseil d’Etat did by 
pretending that the individual wrongs had already been compensated. 
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IV. SOME HOPES? 
Is it permissible to despair? The courts still are hearing cases. The 
Conseil d’Etat as a judge of cassation theoretically maintains 
independence; nevertheless, the outlook is unfavorable.  
A. The Administrative Law Court 
The lower courts which adjudicate issues of fact and law (the 
administrative law courts and the administrative courts of appeal)20 
are not bound by the ruling on a new point of law made by the 
Conseil d’Etat. They are even less bound by it inasmuch as the 
manner of such a decision, already questionable in its principle, 
becomes even more so because the high court, instead of issuing an 
abstract opinion on a point of law as the law requires, engages in 
determinations of fact concerning who was indemnified or not, even 
though the referral has been received with respect to a single case, 
such that the court is incapable from a sheerly practical standpoint of 
identifying all existing situations.  
Nothing in the law prevents the administrative courts from fully 
exercising their judicial powers in all the numerous ongoing lawsuits. 
Nor does anything in fact prevent them from doing so, because how 
would the Conseil d’Etat nullify decrees while taking into account 
harms that were not compensated, or were partially compensated, 
without overstepping its quashing or cassation function and intruding 
on the independent rulings made by the lower courts? 
There is only a faint ray of hope given that the courts rarely stray 
from the case law of the Conseil d’Etat. 
B. The Conseil d’Etat, Judge of Cassation21 
Is there reason to hope that the Conseil d’Etat in its quashing or 
cassation role will not adhere to its opinion given when sitting as a 
court of referral?22 It is highly improbable because it has never yet 
occurred, but legally it is possible. The only hope is that it would not 
be conceivable that the formation of the cassation tribunal would 
include a judge who had contributed to the February 16, 2009 
 
20. The term used in French is juridictions du fond, which, in contrast to de 
cassation, hear only issues of law. 
21. This qualification of ―judge of cassation‖ is given here to distinguish the 
function we saw earlier that the Conseil d’Etat assumed in the Hoffman case, in 
which the court had been asked to render a legal opinion on a new point of law. 
22. See id.  
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decision.  
C. The European Court of Human Rights 
Legitimate hopes were crushed. It was hoped that the Strasbourg 
court would hear issues related to the right to a fair trial and to 
property rights. More particularly, it was reasonable to think that the 
Conseil d’Etat’s decision largely disregards the principle that justice 
requires complete indemnification of harms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the Pelletier decision, the French Conseil d’Etat finally had 
agreed to apply common law to liability for the acts of the Vichy 
government. The Conseil d’Etat had opened the door, only to slam it 
shut a few years later with the Hoffman opinion. The result is 
upsetting, despite beautiful theoretical rulings. Indeed, besides 
Georges Lipietz, the only person who benefitted from the partial 
correction of the law was Papon, half of whose civil liability was paid 
by the State. 
As for the European Court of Strasbourg, it recently23 dismissed 
the claims for compensation of those who were deported on the 
grounds that even the moral wrong has been repaired, which is 
entirely false. It therefore affirmed the Conseil d’Etat’s decision. 
 
 
 
Translated by Alisha L. Jacobsen, as revised by Vivian 
Grosswald Curran and with footnotes in addition to those of 
the author supplied by Vivian Grosswald Curran. 
 
23. Lipietz v. France, E.Ct.H.R, (16 Dec. 2009, No. 49637/09), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=859949&por
tal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&tabl. 
 
 
